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I
INTRODUCTION

Professors Akira Osuka and Mutsuo Nakamura provide two marvelously
rich accounts of Japanese constitutional law.' Professor Osuka's history of
Japanese poverty law, for example, and Professor Nakamura's story of the
constitutional attacks on economic regulation seem exactly the type of studies
we need. Yet their accounts are also a bit troubling: Together, they suggest
that scholars may be missing the questions they should most ask, while courts
may be missing the answers they should most give.
II
DOCTRINE

Both in the United States and in Japan, we often publish assertions instead
of analyses, and sentiments instead of scholarship. Both here and there, we
know better. We do it anyway when we see no choice. So long as we retain
our doctrinal approach to scholarship, however, we will seldom see any
choice. The point is commonplace, but consider some examples from the
material at hand.
After noting that Article 25 of the Japanese Constitution guarantees
"minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living, ' 2 Professor Osuka
describes the doctrinal controversy over it. Unfortunately, the controversy is
a tad beside the point. Were lunch free, Article 25 would seem marvelous. As
it is not, and as no obvious line distinguishes wholesome from unwholesome
living, we ought to be asking what happens when the state guarantees various
standards of living. Were we to draw on social science, we might learn what
social consequences would result from maintaining various levels of economic
inequality. We might learn how much of a tax would fund various minimum
standards, and what dead-weight losses such a tax would impose. We might
even learn what effect different levels of guaranteed income would have on
various incentives. So long as we stick with doctrinal and textual analyses of
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"wholesome and cultured living," however, we will learn nothing. In this, as
in so much of law, the important questions simply are not legal.
Professor Osuka urges courts to interpret the Constitution to preserve
"the cultural aspect of work." 3 Now, more culture may indeed be better than
less (though we who have sat through Wagner's Ring may wonder), but
culture is no freer than lunch, and the state cannot create culture by fiat. As a
result, if the state requires employers to provide workers with levels of
cultural satisfaction that workers have not chosen, the result will necessarily
be Kaldor-Hicks inefficient. 4 For two things will follow. First, any
requirement that employers supply a given level of cultural satisfaction will
function much like a minimum safety standard. As such, it will generally raise
the total compensation package (money plus culture) that employees who
keep their jobs receive, reduce the cash compensation to those employees,
and throw the rest out of work. Second, the requirement will mandate a mix
of cultural satisfaction and money in the compensation package that even
those employees who do stay employed could have but likely would not have
chosen. Had employees wanted such satisfaction, after all, they could have
bargained for it on their own.
Lost in these doctrinal analyses is the point that people make these
bargains. When deciding whether to work, how hard to work, and where to
work, people choose among (and thus implicitly bargain for) consumption
packages that include various levels of leisure, money, security, excitementand culture. Our obsession with doctrine causes us to miss all this because
doctrine misses the world: Necessarily, it misses the way people respond to
courts, to constitutions, and to the way courts interpret constitutions. How
people will respond if the state guarantees employees various levels of
cultural and material satisfaction-this is something we can and should be
studying. Unfortunately, legal doctrine will not help. Yet until we know how
people do respond to courts and constitutions, we cannot hope to know how
courts should interpret constitutions.

III
RENTS

If Professor Osuka's article shows how scholars miss some of the questions
they should most ask, Professor Nakamura shows how courts sometimes miss
the whole show. 5 Apparently many Japanese constitutional cases involve
3. Id. at 26.
4. A move is "Kaldor-Hicks efficient" if "those who would gain from the change could pay
compensation to those who would lose" and thus make the move beneficial to all. See Graetz, Legal
Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 67-68 (1977). Note
that, given the subsidies the state would need to pay in order to enable the state-owned firm to
compete with private employers not providing the same level of cultural satisfaction, the situation
would not be much better if the state provided the employment directly.
5. Nakamura, supra note I.
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flagrantly anticompetitive, rent-seeking ploys. 6 According to the cases
Professor Nakamura cites, however, so long as private groups invoke the
"public interest" in a suitably elaborate fashion, they will rarely find courts
7
blocking those ploys.

Consider some of Professor Nakamura's examples. Rules establishing
minimum distances between bathhouses effectively raise profits to existing
bathhouses. After all, by increasing the cost of patronizing a rival, the rules
make geographic monopolization easier. True, because the state prohibits
price competition in the bathhouse industry, the restrictions may not affect
price. They will, however, lessen the competition in the quality of bathhouse
services. Limits on the distances between retailers and pharmacies
8
accomplish much the same thing.

As a result, each of these regulations enables firms in an industry to extort
wealth from consumers who purchase the services, and to impose on society a
net loss in the form of reduced consumption. Take bathhouses again. By
reducing competition, the restrictions raise the price of a bath (given the
quality of the service) above competitive levels. In so doing, they (a) transfer
wealth to bathhouses from those patrons who continue to bathe at the higher
price (given the level of service) and (b) create a social loss when some
patrons who would have bathed in a competitive bathhouse market go
unwashed because they find the services too poor (given the price). Much the
same analysis applies to the other industries involved. Under current
doctrine, however, so long as the industry explicitly and elaborately invokes
the public interest, such restrictions are generally constitutional.
That Japanese firms manipulate the state to obtain advantageous
regulatory schemes should not surprise us; 9 much the same thing happens in
most societies.' 0 Nor should the willingness of Japanese courts to protect
such ploys surprise us; much the same thing happens in the United States."
The Japanese-American comparison is not, however, accidental: It was
Roosevelt's regulatory program that the United States Supreme Court
attacked before the Court finally backed down, and it was apparently with that
experience in mind that, some ten years later, Truman's lawyers in Tokyo
6.
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installed a constitution that dropped "property" from the rights protected by
2
due process.1
The same analysis applies to Professor Osuka's program to let professors
structure the educational services industry. Professor Osuka argues that in
education "social rights and civil liberties are closely interconnected."' 3 As a
result, says he, the state should let suppliers in the educational services
industry determine their own regulatory structure. Unfortunately, almost all
modern studies of regulation suggest that industry suppliers are among the
last groups who should be allowed to structure regulatory schemes.14 The
Japanese state probably restricted competition among bathhouses, retailers,
and pharmacies, after all, precisely because it lets bathhouses, retailers, and
pharmacies dominate the regulatory process.
Accordingly, professors may be among the worst people to regulate the
educational services industry.15 Plenty of casual evidence confirms the point.
In the United States, for example, professors have largely wrested control
over universities away from students and benefactors, and control over the
industry from everyone else. They dominate accreditation committees and
use accreditation standards to try to enforce anticompetitive terms within the
industry.' 6 Under those standards, for instance, firms (universities) may not
fire even flagrantly unproductive workers (see tenure rules). Neither can they
7
hire low-cost potential competitors (see degree requirements for hiring).'
Professor Osuka argues that the educational services industry involves
values that are more "fundamental" than values elsewhere, and that those
values justify this departure from common economic sense. Maybe so-but
we should think twice. Members of an industry almost always argue that
theirs is uniquely fundamental: We learn from Professor Nakamura that even
junk dealers have successfully asserted a public interest in regulation.' 8 We
need more, this ought to suggest, before we decide education is so special.
IV
CONCLUSION

Professors Osuka and Nakamura give us wonderfully rich accounts of
Japanese constitutional law. In so doing, though, they also give us rich
accounts of where scholars and courts have gone wrong. In Japan, as here in
the United States, many legal scholars apparently retain their fascination with
doctrine. In the process, they (a) miss the most important problems they
12.
13.
14.
15.
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RELATIONSHIPS 614, 625-29 (H. Manne ed. 1975).
16. Loss of accreditation often drives professional schools out of business.
17. In some ways, the situation in Japan is quite similar. See, e.g., Hall, OrganizationalParalysis:
The Case of Todai, in MODERN JAPANESE ORGANIZATION AND DECISION-MAKING 304 (E. Vogel ed. 1975).
18. Japan v. Manabe, 7 Keishu 577, 580 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Mar. 18, 1953) 1953); see Nakamura,
supra note 1, at 4.
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could solve (what would happen if the state did X?) and (b) instead try to
answer questions about which (not having considered problem (a)) they
necessarily have less to say (what should the state do?). In Japan, as here,
courts have largely renounced the power to stop private business groups from
manipulating the state to obtain wealth transfers from consumers. In the
process, they have let those groups impose large welfare losses on everyone
else. In this respect, the state of constitutional law may not be much worse in
Japan than in the United States; apparently, however, it is not much better.

